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Abstract 
In this paper, we use the case of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe to address the question 
of what kind of knowledge we should incorporate into public health policy. We show that 
policy-making in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic has been biomedicine-centric in that 
its evidential basis marginalised input from non-biomedical disciplines. We then argue that in 
particular the social sciences could contribute essential expertise and evidence to public 
health policy in times of biomedical emergencies and that we should thus strive for a tighter 
integration of the social sciences in future evidence-based policy-making. This demand faces 
challenges on different levels, which we identify and discuss as potential inhibitors for a more 
pluralistic evidential basis.  
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Policy decisions have been influenced by scientific evidence since the 19th century at least. 
However, the idea of placing scientific evidence at the centre of policy has more recent origins 
and has only been promoted as ‘evidence-based policy’ in the last few decades. Beginning 
in the UK in the 1990s, evidence-based policy was advocated in several important policy 
areas – such as social and environmental policy – and spread to many other countries in the 
world (Nutly et al., 2010). Today, policy-making relies on scientific expertise, knowledge, and 
evidence to an extent that it has never done before. In this paper we focus on a specific policy 
area where this strong dependency on scientific evidence has been highlighted to an 
extraordinary degree by the COVID-19 pandemic: public health. Our motivational starting 
point for this paper is the observation that public health measures and strategies meant to 
deal with the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to be predominantly informed by the biomedical 
sciences, in particular epidemiology.1 Biomedicine was in the epistemic centre of policy-
making while other potentially relevant sciences, in particular the social sciences, played only 
a marginal role. We are not the first to note this: consider this critical statement by Mark 
Woolhouse, a professor of infectious disease epidemiology at the University of Edinburgh and 
member of SAGE in the UK (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies), that appeared in The 
Guardian in April 2020:  
 
“I do think scientific advice is driven far too much by epidemiology – and I’m 
an epidemiologist. What we’re not talking about in the same formal, 
quantitative way are the economic costs, the social costs, the psychological 
costs of being under lockdown. […] I understand that the government is being 
advised by economists, psychiatrists and others, but we’re not seeing what 
that science is telling them” (Devlin & Boseley, 2020). 
 
1 Here and throughout the paper, we use a broad notion of ‘biomedicine’, including epidemiology, life science 
research with health applications, clinical research, and related health sciences.  
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This critique of health policy in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic raises a number of 
questions: To what extent does the diagnosis of biomedicine-centric governmental response 
actually stand up to scrutiny? What does it mean to criticise the response to the pandemic 
for its lack of inclusion of other sciences (in the same formal way)? Would we actually need 
to integrate other areas of knowledge into public health policy? If so, how can we integrate 
social and biomedical sciences in particular? 
 
In this paper, we discuss these questions by analysing science-policy relations in the COVID-
19 context and explore the governmental response to the pandemic through the lens of 
‘philosophy of science in practice’. Specifically, we follow this approach by focusing on the 
processes and activities, rather than (solely) on the products of scientific research, as the 
main units of our philosophical analysis (Chang, 2014). We believe that this approach is 
particularly suited for exploring the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic, as it allows for a timely 
consideration of ongoing scientific developments and their relation with policy-making. As a 
consequence of this approach we do not aim to build a final analysis of policy-making during 
the pandemic.2 Rather, we want to highlight and analyse certain aspects of evidence-based 
policy-making in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic that will help us to uncover deeper 
conceptual, epistemological, and methodological aspects of evidence-based policy. Our 
analysis will focus on developments in Europe, which has been one of the earliest areas to be 
affected by COVID-19 and has been a hotspot of the pandemic. Following a bottom-up 
approach, we get to the more conceptual and normative level of our analysis by treating 
examples from the European context as instantiations of the phenomena we intend to uncover 
and assess (see Morgan, 2012). Our approach also follows Lohse et al. (2020) by paying 
special attention to the entanglement of epistemic aspects and ethical, legal, and social issues 
of evidence-based policy. 
 
2 Our analysis is limited to the period up to the beginning of 2021. It is also limited by the fact that we are writing 
this as a process continues to unfold, based in part on newspaper articles and preprints, with new information 
on pandemic policy in Europe emerging on a weekly basis. 




We think the case of the COVID-19 pandemic is interesting in itself but can also be used to 
understand deeper epistemic issues in public health policy that “follows the science” (a claim 
made by several European governments) – in particular in relation with pluralism and 
knowledge integration. The core normative problem underlying these issues has not received 
much attention in the literature on evidence-based policy. Questions about the right kind of 
evidence and expertise are primarily discussed in terms of causal evidence, evidence 
hierarchies, and generalisability (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Cartwright & Stegenga, 2011). 
We believe, however, that health policy-making during the COVID-19 pandemic has drawn 
attention to yet another aspect of evidence-based policy: We need to think more about 
diversity of evidence and expertise from different sources and about integrating different 
scientific fields.  
 
In discussing evidence-based policy on COVID-19, we should note that policy-making never 
really follows science in a very strict sense, that it is always also a matter of power, politics, 
regulatory constraints, bureaucracy, and the “survival of the ideas that fit” (Stevens, 2007) on 
which policy-makers actually act. Many public health strategies and changes in COVID-19-
related policy in late 2020 (and early 2021) in European countries can be used to illustrate this 
claim. We also agree with Jasanoff that “the scientific story presented to the public” although 
influenced by scientific advice “is finally a creation of the political process” (Jasanoff 1987: 
197f). However, this does not mean that we should give up on the idea of evidence-based 
policy or that normative reflections on pluralism in evidence-based policy are useless. 
Although policy is not “driven” or “determined” by science, scientific knowledge does have 
an influence on policy-making – in an indirect, transformed way, nested in political processes. 
Thus we need to reflect on normative issues that bear on the kinds of evidence that should 
be used for policy-making. Without this, we can hardly know in which ways we should 
improve science-oriented policy-making. 
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The paper is structured as follows. We start by discussing three main stages of COVID-19 
policy-making, putting a special focus on science-policy relations and the reception of 
scientific expertise (Sect. 2). It will become clear that the biomedical sciences, in particular 
epidemiology, were indeed in the epistemic centre of all these stages. We will show that this 
holds true not only for the beginning of the pandemic, when authorities needed to act fast in 
view of a potentially severe health threat to the population, but also at a later stage of the 
response to the pandemic. Section 3 presents reasons for why this is problematic by 
highlighting elements that the social sciences could bring to the table to improve the 
understanding and management of pandemics. Based on this, we claim that we should strive 
for a tighter integration of the social sciences in future evidence-based public health policy. 
We then turn to key challenges to the realisation of this demand (Sect. 4), discussing 
conceptual issues in relation to the notion of ‘public health’, epistemological differences 
between biomedicine and the social sciences, and methodological problems in selecting, 
gathering and integrating data on social phenomena for policy-making. Section 5 concludes 
by drawing out normative implications of our analysis. 
 
 
2. Development stages of the pandemic in Europe  
How did governmental bodies respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe? This is a 
question to which there are different answers, depending on which aspects of COVID-19 
policy one considers. In the context of this paper, we are particularly interested in the 
disciplinary and evidential basis of policy. We discuss several examples from continental 
Europe, in particular Italy and Germany (the countries we are based at), in order to expand 
the focus beyond the often-discussed cases from the US and the UK. We are not aiming for 
a detailed historical account of the events, but we want to highlight a number of noteworthy 
features in the relations between science and policy and the ways in which scientific expertise 
was requested and used on the basis of various examples. What emerges as a result of our 
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analysis is that, throughout the pandemic, European governments and policy bodies 
predominantly relied on the biomedical sciences, experts in biomedicine and biomedical 
evidence, to guide their policy-making while other disciplines played only a marginal role. 
With this we do not mean that non-biomedical issues were not considered at all by policy-
makers. For instance, considerations regarding childhood education, the labour market, and 
funding aimed at the economic recovery of European countries after the pandemic have 
constantly been an important element of pandemic policy in Europe. Yet for the most part 
these and other policy decisions were considerably less based on evidence and expertise 
from the social sciences.  
 
We discuss three main stages of pandemic policy: preparation, emergency, and long-term.3 
The reasoning for using this typology in our analysis is twofold. In the policy literature, most 
paradigms and pathways for pandemic response utilise a distinction between public health 
strategies aimed at preparedness, emergency, and long-term as the three main areas of focus 
(Allen et al., 2020). The classification enables us to highlight how some of the phenomena that 
we want to discuss in the rest of the article were specific to one of the stages and how others 
have played an important role throughout the response to COVID-19. At the same time, this 
is a way for us to specify our analysis and break it down to individual cases and examples at 
different stages of policy. This allows us to analyse the temporal development of pandemic 
policy vis-à-vis the timeline of COVID-19 outbreaks without restricting our claims to individual 
waves of the pandemic. Although these three stages are mostly subsequential, throughout 
the COVID-19 pandemic we have seen that for example emergency interventions were 
implemented several times and preparedness was a debated issue after the initial outbreaks 




3 As a result of our focus on these three stages here, we will not include post-pandemic policy in our analysis. 
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2.1 Preparing for the emerging pandemic 
Between the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, policy makers and disease control 
agencies in Europe started to monitor the development of the new SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus 
that had its initial outbreak in China in December 2019. While individual countries are primarily 
responsible for public health and medical care, and EU institutions can only complement 
national policies, at this stage, many initiatives were initially led by the EU commission. 
Dedicated response teams were only set up in March though, with the establishment of a 
political team led by the EU Commission, an advisory panel composed of epidemiologists 
and virologists from different European countries and a communication support system for 
knowledge exchange between healthcare professionals on COVID-19.4  
 
In the meantime, in late February 2020 a cluster of cases was detected in the north of Italy, in 
the regions of Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna. In late February, Italy was the worst-
hit country in the EU in terms of the number of infections and deaths by COVID-19 (Remuzzi 
& Remuzzi, 2020). Regional and city authorities started to implement initial policy measures, 
which included local and restricted lockdowns, the closing of schools and curfews for bars 
and cafes. The national government started to rely on the newly established crisis response 
team in early February (Comitato Tecnico-Scientifico, CTS), which has acted as a consultant 
for government policy throughout the pandemic (Pistoi, 2021).  
 
The formation of expert and crisis teams is a crucial element of preparing for biomedical 
emergencies, which is why we are focusing on this specific element of the preparation stage 
in this section. This element is also a window into the choices and assumptions about the 
types of expertise and evidence that are considered necessary for dealing with an emergency. 
Right from these first steps, one of the points we want to emphasise was evident: while 
 
4  See “Timeline of EU Action” https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/timeline-eu-
action_en (accessed July 2021). 
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observatory and preparatory steps were led by political bodies at national and international 
levels, institutions largely relied on biomedical experts. For example, the Italian CTS is 
composed of biomedical experts, including medical doctors, epidemiologists, health 
professionals, and head physicians of some of the largest hospitals in the country, and 
members of the Ministry of Health.5 Similar steps were taken by other European governments 
in February and March.  For instance, in the UK the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies 
(SAGE) was activated for the study and preparation of COVID-19 in late January. In Germany, 
local governments started to establish response teams in late February, in coordination with 
experts based at the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and the Federal Ministry of Health. The RKI 
is the national public health institute in Germany, which relies on biomedical scientists based 
at various universities in Germany and works on the basis of specific sub-groups and 
committees on biomedical issues. A similar institution has been responsible for the COVID-
19 crisis in Spain, where the government has relied on the Coordination Centre for Health 
Alerts and Emergencies based at the Ministry of Health. In France, the government set up its 
special experts team on COVID-19 (Conseil scientifique Covid-19), under the coordination of 
the ministry of health, comprising environmental and infectious disease epidemiologists, 
disease modellers, virologists, and bioinformaticians.  
 
As we will see, these choices made at the preparation stage remained central beyond 
immediate emergencies, and this has been the case for most expert teams in Europe, which 
have continued to advise governments on policy during the summer and winter of 2020, 




5 The official composition of this expert committee was officially announced in late April and was updated in 
early 2021. European governments have reveiled their choices of experts in different ways: in some countries, 
the lists of participants were announced from the start, while in others they have not been officially announced 
(yet). 
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2.2 Emergency: crisis responses in Europe 
In Spring 2020 two main events signalled the transition from the preparation to the emergency 
stage of the pandemic. In early March, the number of COVID-19 infections and deaths 
connected to the pandemic in the north Italy region of Lombardy started to rise very 
significantly (Goumenou et al., 2020). The Italian government, on the basis of these 
developments and the coordination with the CTS, applied a ‘lockdown’ in Lombardy, which 
included the closure of all shops and activities considered non-essential and became nation-
wide in mid-March.6 Around the same time, the COVID-19 Response Team based at Imperial 
College London published a modelling study that developed a number of different 
(conditional) scenarios for the development of the pandemic in the UK, and the US (Ferguson 
et al., 2020). The study crucially predicted that, in case of no action by governments with 
decisive measures to suppress the spreading of the virus, many countries would see an 
uncontrolled development of the disease and a crisis of healthcare systems, with a 
consequently extremely high number of deaths. 
 
The Lombardy case and the Imperial College Model shifted the focus of policy-makers and 
prompted governments to take swift actions, which were mostly informed by biomedical 
evidence and expertise (Adam, 2020). For instance, the actions taken in Italy were presented 
and justified on the basis of reproduction numbers of the SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus that 
measures the average number of people that a person infected with the virus infect. In the 
epidemiology of infectious disease and epidemics, reproduction numbers are key figures to 
understand the spreading of disease, as they depend both on biological features of a virus 
and the development stage of an epidemic. The use of reproduction numbers continued to 
be central for justifying policy measures in subsequent emergency situations in Europe, in 
particular during the second and third waves of 2020 and early 2021. In addition, governments 
 
6 We use the term ‘lockdown’ with caution here, as it has been used throughout the pandemic to refer to several 
different and significantly diverse policies, from the closure of non-essential shops to restrictions to travelling 
and visits to friends and family (including curfews).   
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started to rely on biomedical indicators such as incidence, hospitalisation rate, and number 
of available beds in ICUs (intensive care units) to assess local developments and deploy more 
specific mitigation measures (see e.g. the colour-based systems applied in Germany and Italy 
and the tier system used in the UK). 
 
Predictive (and also backwards directed) modelling has remained a central source of 
guidance for European governments (Chin et al., 2021). In particular sophisticated agent-
based models, like the Imperial College model, which simulate interactions between 
susceptible and infected agents in a population over a certain time interval, have been very 
influential modelling tools (next to equation-based models and curve-fitting approaches, see 
Fuller, 2021). Although this type of model uses census data on some social/demographic 
characteristics (e.g. household distribution and population age characteristics) to calibrate 
several parameters, it is crucially based on a biomedical rationale and aims at a projection of 
the effects of the spreading of the disease and of different mitigation strategies on the number 
of deaths, infection rates, hospitalisations, and the healthcare system. 
 
The centrality of the biomedical lens and focus at this stage of the pandemic has also been 
evident in the broader public sphere, in particular in the media and on social media platforms. 
Media discussions started to heavily use biomedical data and concepts, including the 
reproduction number R, and relied on biomedical experts, especially from virology and 
epidemiology. This has in turn influenced policy-making. A striking example for this claim is 
the highly influential Medium article “Coronavirus: The Hammer and the Dance” (Pueyo, 
2020), which outlined a COVID-19 strategy that has even been discussed in a 2020 white 
paper by the federal government in Germany.7 
 
 
7 See ”Wie wir COVID-19 unter Kontrolle bekommen“ (“How we get COVID-19 under control“), 
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2020/corona/szenarienpapier-
covid19.html (accessed July 2021). 
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2.3 Long-term: policy-making in light of COVID-19  
A last stage of pandemic policy-making we want to discuss is long-term planning. In Europe, 
this stage has been most evident in spring/summer 2020, a period sometimes described as 
the ‘new normal’. In this context, many governments tried to apply more targeted measures 
and took a step back from large-scale interventions. Quarantine periods were introduced for 
travellers coming from areas deemed as risky on the basis of infection and reproduction rates 
of COVID-19. Since spring 2020, the German RKI has kept a running list of risk areas, which 
it updated weekly to include areas, cities, or entire countries from which travelling entails the 
need for a negative test or a quarantine period. The targeted approach also includes COVID-
19 policy regimes that have emerged in several European countries at this stage of the 
pandemic, i.e. tier systems where specific regions of countries are assigned different and 
more or less severe levels of restrictions and interventions (e.g. school and university 
closures, economic lockdown measures, and contact restrictions), depending on the infection 
levels in the area. These and similar regulations have changed continuously and substantially, 
as governments have tweaked the number of days that constitute a quarantine, the type of 
test required at entry and the time at which it should be conducted – the variability and 
instability of policy interventions has been a general feature of long-term COVID-19 
management.  
 
Governments clearly continued to rely on expertise and evidence mostly coming from the 
biomedical sciences at this stage. For instance, the development of smartphone applications 
in the summer of 2020 has been discussed in terms of epidemiological considerations and 
approaches to tracking and tracing (Leonelli, 2021a). Biomedical concerns were at the basis 
of investments aimed at increasing the number of ICU beds and infrastructure and testing 
rates: this was particularly evident in countries such as Spain and Italy, which have a low 
density of ICUs compared with countries such as Germany, as this disproportion was 
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considered a crucial difference maker for the impact of the pandemic in these countries 
(Furlong & Hirshc, 2020). 
 
Let’s take stock. European public health measures and strategies around COVID-19 have 
predominantly been informed by the biomedical sciences. Other sciences, in particular the 
social sciences, have hardly contributed to the evidential base of the pandemic crisis 
management by European governments.8  Note that our point is not that other sciences have 
been completely excluded. Economic projections informed cost-benefit analyses and policy-
decisions; some of the reports with policy-impact published by the Leopoldina in Germany 
have been authored by expert groups with a minority of biomedical scientists (e.g. 
Leopoldina, 2020);9 and one of the two main French expert groups includes anthropologists, 
sociologists and ethicists. But our reconstruction of events shows that these and similar 
examples must be understood against the backdrop of the epistemic hegemony of 
biomedicine.    
 
This hegemony is problematic because the COVID-19 pandemic as well as pandemics and 
epidemics more generally cannot be conceptualised as purely biological phenomena. Rather, 
pandemics have social and political aspects and consequences. Hence, they need to be 
considered as “syndemics” (Horton, 2020) with entangled biological and social aspects. This 
implies that policy-makers need to widen their perspective and take the social aspects of 
COVID-19 more seriously. Taking these aspects more seriously means taking scientific 
evidence and expertise on social and political phenomena into account properly. This demand 
suggests a central place for the social sciences as providers of this kind of evidence and 
expertise at the table of evidence-based policy. To be fair, social aspects will be addressed 
 
8 As far as we know this is true of other parts of the world too. 
9 The German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina is a historic academic institution, similar to the Royal 
Society in the UK, whose role includes the representation of the German scientific community and the 
development of science-based advice for policy-making and the public. 
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to some extent in social epidemiology and public health (the research area), e.g. with respect 
to health effects of social structure.10 But the social sciences (in particular sociology, political 
science, and cultural anthropology) have a broader perspective that includes non-health-
related social and political aspects of pandemics. Although there may be alternative ways to 
address these issues (e.g. expanding social epidemiology), we believe that the social sciences 
are currently our best available option.11 
 
 
3. A role for the social sciences 
From an epistemological point of view, the focus on one epistemic perspective (biomedicine) 
and the lack of disciplinary diversity in policy can be understood as a case of insufficient 
epistemic pluralism (Lohse & Bschir, 2020). Insufficient epistemic pluralism is problematic 
because it can limit our options to understand a vastly unknown but policy-relevant reality, 
which is especially true in light of the fact that scientific knowledge is always perspectival and 
fallible. But what does a lack of epistemic pluralism actually imply in policy contexts, in 
particular in relation to the social sciences? To answer this question we will use the COVID-
19 pandemic to show that the social sciences could contribute unique perspectives and 
essential evidence to understanding and managing pandemics. More specifically, we will 
illustrate three ways in which the social sciences can contribute essential elements to 
evidence-based pandemic management. We are not the first to bring up these points (e.g., 
Bavel et al., 2020; Popa, 2021) and we rely on work by others, but it will be useful to list and 
discuss several examples to show that the social sciences can be important to public health 
policy in many more ways than one might expect. 
 
 
10 See, e.g., the policy briefings by the Competence Network for Public Health COVID-19, https://www.public-
health-covid19.de/en/results.html (accessed July 2021). 
11 Note that social epidemiology and other fields that overlap with social science research have been largely left 
out of the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic too. 




Pandemic surveillance is one of the key functions provided and supported by the sciences 
during pandemics – a function that could indeed benefit from social scientific input. In 
particular, the social sciences could improve our ability to understand in which kinds of social 
situations people are (more) likely to get infected with a highly infectious virus, for instance by 
systematically backtracking sub-samples (e.g. people with certain occupations or socio-
economic backgrounds) of infected people (Streeck, 2020). More globally, the social sciences 
could help to monitor pandemics and their transmission dynamics. Consider COVID-19 
prevalence: the social sciences could have brought critical considerations regarding data and 
testing strategies to the table, including generating representative samples in different 
countries to better understand the influence of social structure on disease transmission 
dynamics – a task that is far from trivial. Many social scientists (and economists) have 
demanded representative surveys throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, to reduce our 
ignorance regarding the actual number of infected people and to better assess the 
effectiveness of different types of policy interventions. A key reason for this demand lies in 
serious methodological problems in comparing countries with different testing strategies, 
heterogeneous populations and a different mix of health interventions to estimate the 
effectiveness of interventions such as school closures and curfews (we will come back to this 
point). 
 
In addition, social scientific expertise and tools can shed light on several contextual features 
of data practices, for example by providing information on different testing strategies. This is 
crucial knowledge because it helps with the comparison of different and local datasets: how 
can we compare infection rates when some regions of a country have access to more testing 
units than others and when threshold levels for test results change over time? The social 
sciences can be key here because contextual factors such as these are frequently latent 
aspects of data practices and can only partially be accounted for by statistical estimates. For 
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instance, most testing in Europe and elsewhere during the pandemic was recorded locally, 
with counting practices and testing criteria often differing and changing significantly between 
municipalities and regions of the same country (Porter, 2021). This, however, was only 
occasionally apparent to – and rarely fully appreciated by – policy-makers and the media. 
Rather, data use was often underpinned by the assumption that quantitative data convey 
reliable and unambiguous information, which can be applied directly to decision-making 
(Leonelli, 2021a). Social scientific investigations can help to question this assumption and to 
unearth social dynamics and local discrepancies in data practices – thus crucially improving 
data interpretation, integration, and harmonisation. 
 
The relevance of the social sciences for pandemic surveillance is even more evident in the 
context of digital health monitoring tools, such as smartphone apps and fitness trackers. 
Klingwort and Schnell (2020) draw on survey theory and social scientific findings to show that 
the use of these digital tools to track the spread of COVID-19 in the population, as suggested 
by several health agencies, would lead to unreliable conclusions because they will be based 
on biased samples with unknown population coverage as well as systematic 
underrepresentation of marginalised groups. Note that this type of criticism is not merely 
rooted in statistics, but draws on country-specific knowledge regarding social structure and 
other social aspects, including affinity to digital technology and prevalence of smartphone 
use. 
 
Surveillance is not only relevant for understanding prevalence and transmission dynamics of 
infectious diseases in different parts of society, but also to monitor policy interventions and 
adapt to unanticipated consequences of policy measures. For example, compliance with 
social distancing rules and mask-wearing can be investigated using social research methods 
such as interviews and questionnaires (see Munzert & Selb, 2020 for challenges in this 
context). A (rare) best practice example for this type of surveillance is the Mannheim Corona 
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Study (Blom et al., 2020), which informed the federal government in Germany regarding socio-
economic effects of the pandemic and “the influence of political measures on social 
interactions, fears and the social acceptance of measures to contain the pandemic” based 
on a daily updated representative longitudinal study.12 This type of research can contribute to 
a more fine grained picture of challenges to adopting health measures in different social 
groups and, even more importantly, it can generate evidence for more comprehensive harm-
benefit analyses. This may include data pointing to indirect social harms such as growing 
inequalities and social disruption, harms that happen beneath the surface and that may – 
without a social scientific perspective – stay undetected or at least unrecognised in its true 
extent (Lohse & Bschir, 2020). 
 
3.2 Predicting   
There is extensive literature on prevalent social problems in Europe that is highly relevant for 
pandemics, including findings on class and milieu inequalities, gender relations, domestic 
violence, structural racism, insufficient social participation of people with disabilities, and 
related issues. Social scientific knowledge of this kind is necessary to make predictions 
regarding likely short- and mid-term societal consequences of pandemics and mitigation 
policies. This applies because there is a strong correlation between socioeconomic status 
and health. This includes not only aspects that are common knowledge in epidemiology (i.e. 
socio-economic differences in vulnerability due to pre-existing conditions), but also social 
factors that contribute more indirectly to this relationship, for instance through a higher 
likelihood of the transmission of an infectious respiratory disease in low-income groups with 
fewer opportunities for reducing job-related mobility, more frequent use of public 
 
12 See https://www.uni-mannheim.de/en/gip/corona-study/ and https://www.uni-
mannheim.de/newsroom/presse/pressemitteilungen/2020/april/corona-studie-teil-4/ (accessed July 2021). See 
also Germany’s COSMO snap shot monitoring, https://projekte.uni-erfurt.de/cosmo2020/web/ (accessed July 
2021). 
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transportation and grocery shopping in crowded supermarkets, etc.13 Furthermore, it is hardly 
surprising from a sociological perspective that lockdown measures can have vastly different 
effects on children from different socio-economic backgrounds. Likewise, it would be 
possible to predict – at least qualitatively14 – gender-related differences in childcare during 
lockdowns that stabilise pre-existing inequalities between men and women (Walter, 2021). 
 
In addition, sociologists, cultural scholars, and political scientists have long addressed 
specific societal effects of past epidemics, such as the SARS (CoV-1) epidemic (2002-2004, 
mostly in parts of Asia) and the Western African Ebola Virus epidemic (2014-2016). Consider 
the edited volume SARS in China. Prelude to Pandemic? (Kleinman & Watson, 2006), which 
investigates the underlying question of what we can learn from the SARS outbreak in China 
for future pandemics. The book comprises several articles on societal aspects of the epidemic 
in China, including the political and health system infrastructure underlying China’s response 
to the epidemic and social stigmatisation issues in the context of the disease. While it is clear 
that these findings cannot be transferred directly to other pandemics and parts of the world, 
they may indeed be useful for identifying best practice approaches in health care 
administration, improve prediction of likely and unlikely scenarios, or at least raise awareness 
for potential socio-political issues. 
 
A third point concerns the type of epidemiological modelling that, as we have seen, has been 
in the centre of predicting the spread of the virus and impact of mitigation measures for 
COVID-19. Many scholars have emphasised that these models are based on uncertain 
assumptions and have criticised their role in policy-making for the lack of consideration of 
these epistemic limitations (Saltelli et al., 2020; Sridhar & Majumder, 2020; see, however, 
 
13 Chang et al.’s (2021) mobility network study, which combines biomedical and social scientific expertise with 
sophisticated informatics to better understand demographic and socio-economic differences in COVID-19 
infections, vividly illustrates the relevance of these factors for the pandemic.  
14 This qualification reflects the hitherto lack of success in quantitatively exact predictions in the social sciences.   
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Marziarz & Zach, 2020 and the discussion in van Baßhuysen & White, 2021). What we want 
to add to the discussion is a potential critical contribution of the social sciences to models 
and their use for policy. The social sciences could help highlight the multidimensional 
heterogeneity of different societies, thus avoiding unwarranted conclusions by analogy, 
based on coarse-grained computer simulations and oversimplifying comparisons between 
not-so-homologous countries. Furthermore, knowledge about social networks could help 
modelling different parts of individual societies. Manzo (2020) argues that prevalent 
epidemiological models neither include information about ‘social hubs’ (individuals with many 
social contacts) nor about relevant research on contact networks and behavioural patterns, 
which, however, are highly relevant for modelling disease transmission patterns on a more 
fine grained level – a level that would most likely be relevant for targeted public health 
measures (see Herrman & Schwartz, 2020).15 Finally, the social sciences could help to cope 
with one of the most difficult problems of modelling pandemics: social feedback effects of 
pandemic-, policy- and prediction-induced human behavioural changes (Holmdahl & Buckee, 
2020; Friedman et al., 2020; van Baßhuysen et al. 2021). These can play a decisive role during 
pandemics, such as when people started to underestimate the dynamic spread of COVID-19 
in autumn/winter 2020, partly as a consequence of the abatement of the first wave and 
relatively unproblematic summer months, which in turn were at least in part a result of 
behavioural change encouraged by epidemiological projections. 
 
3.3 Intervening 
The social sciences can also contribute to increase the effectiveness of public health 
measures. In general, social scientific findings on designing choice architectures, 
communication of policy, and public compliance are an important asset for public health 
policy-making, as for instance non-compliance regarding self-isolation in quarantine and 
 
15 Note that social network modelling is not only a research field in the social sciences, but is frequently truly 
interdisciplinary, integrating work from the social, life, physical and computer sciences. 
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using face masks is cited as an important challenge to transmission mitigation (Nofal et al., 
2020). Based on the importance of compliance with non-pharmaceutical strategies, Michie 
and colleagues (2020) have argued for the claim that “behavioural science must be at the 
heart of the public health response” to the COVID-19 pandemic. A key reason for this claim 
ties in with the observation made by several philosophers of science and policy (e.g.  
Cartwright & Stegenga, 2011) that we need to do more than to identify a potentially effective 
mechanism to assess the effectiveness of a policy intervention. We need substantial and 
detailed knowledge regarding the societal environment of a suggested policy measure to 
allow for a meaningful assessment. Under what circumstances do curfews work? To what 
extent are people in the UK, France or Italy less likely to adhere to travel restrictions? In finding 
answers to questions like these (social) context is king. 
 
Another way in which the social sciences could contribute to the effectiveness of pandemic 
crisis management is by including knowledge of key stakeholders into policy-making. In many 
cases, this is done by ad-hoc policy advice by (non-transparently) chosen individuals and 
organisations (Oliver & Pearce, 2017). Qualitative research and surveys, on the other hand, 
could contribute to a more systematic inclusion of perspectives and local knowledge. 16 This 
includes evidence on the effects of school closures, day-care centres and other important 
parts of social infrastructure, but also viewpoints that might be relevant for fine-tuning policy 
measures – such as decisions regarding feasible and manageable hygiene and sanitation in 
primary schools, informed by experiences and knowledge of people on the ground. 
 
The social sciences can be crucial for devising policy measures that have less (unintended) 
side-effects and are better targeted. An example for the first part of this claim are mobility 
restriction approaches that attempt to integrate epidemiological effectiveness and socio-
 
16 There is also an argument to made for a more direct inclusion of local knowledge, external to science, in 
evidence-based public health policy (Kearnes et al., 2020; Bschir & Lohse, 2021). 
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economic feasibility (see the smart mobility concept in the interdisciplinary “No COVID” 
strategy paper17). Or consider the social network modelling by Kaiser et al. (2021) investigating 
different ways to divide school classes (to reduce the risk of COVID-19 outbreaks in schools) 
and ways to minimise unintended out-of-school contacts between students as a way to fine-
tune lock-down policies. Better targeted policy measures could address marginalised 
communities and vulnerable groups more successfully, by providing information regarding 
the distribution of face masks in socio-economically disadvantaged groups and by targeted 
information campaigns that are informed by social research on minorities that may be more 
likely to respond to non-mainstream communication approaches, among other things. All of 
these examples represent ways the social sciences could be key in devising proportional 
pandemic policies with a more local focus instead of using “the hammer” (Pueyo, 2020) all 
too often. 
 
We take it that our discussion shows that the social sciences could have played a key role in 
the COVID-19 pandemic and should play a more prominent role in similar public health crises 
in the future. The social sciences can contribute invaluable insights and make fruitful 
contributions at various levels to better deal with the effects of pandemics and the unintended 
side-effects of pandemic management. The social sciences do not only have the capacity to 
improve existing monitoring/prediction strategies and broaden the evidential basis for policy-
making, in particular by providing contextual knowledge. They can also diversify the available 







(accessed February 2021), see also Horton (2021).  
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4. Epistemic challenges for including the social sciences 
If our assessment so far is correct, we should strive for a tighter integration of the social 
sciences into evidence-based policy-making. We should also ask why the social sciences 
were not more involved in COVID-19 crisis management and, more importantly, to what 
extent (and how) it may be possible to change the epistemic status quo to be better prepared 
for the next pandemic. However, as we move towards a more pluralistic evidential basis for 
health policy, challenges and inhibiting factors can be expected at various levels. As a first 
step to address these, we identify and discuss several epistemic challenges below. 
 
Before we continue, we need to make four remarks to help framing our discussion and its 
underlying goals. (1) Some of the challenges for knowledge integration we want to discuss 
are specific to the public health context, some are more general and well-known in philosophy 
of science. Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight the latter’s importance in this context. (2) 
Several issues have a long and complex history, to which we will not be able to do justice 
within the scope of this paper. Then again, this is not required for the systematic purposes of 
our discussion. (3) Many of the epistemic challenges that we want to discuss overlap and 
interact in interesting ways. For this reason, the next passages should be understood as an 
analytical description of a more complex and more entangled reality. (4) We believe that in 
reality some combination of epistemic challenges and sociological factors has inhibited a 
more prominent role of the social sciences during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sociological 
factors may include differences in public prestige between biomedicine and the social 
sciences, institutional regimes that prioritise certain forms of knowledge, and different styles 
of public and media engagement of “scientists offering facts” and “public intellectuals 
providing critical reflections on policy” (cf. Busch, 2009). However, this paper does not aim at 
a historical explanation (including sociological elements) for the lack of social scientific 
expertise in policy-making during the COVID-19 pandemic. We believe nevertheless that our 
discussion of epistemic challenges for a tighter integration of the social sciences in public 
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health policy can be useful. For one thing, it provides a starting point for an actual historical 
explanation of events in 2020-2021. Furthermore, it can help us think critically about potential 
obstacles – and ways to overcome these – on our way to pluralise evidence-based public 
health policy. Against this backdrop, we focus on epistemic aspects, organising our 
discussion into conceptual, epistemological and methodological challenges.  
 
4.1 Conceptual challenges 
The concepts ‘disease’ and ‘public health’, as they are used in public discourse today, are 
biomedicine-centric concepts. This does not mean that no one is aware that diseases have 
psycho-social components or that public health also depends on socio-economic factors. 
But the biomedical perspective is the dominant perspective defining the use and connotation 
of these concepts. Diseases (with the notable exception of psychiatric syndromes) are 
primarily seen as biological phenomena that are caused by biological and other material 
factors, such as viruses, toxicological substances and unhealthy diets. In public health, there 
is a similar tendency to highlight biological aspects of factors that influence the health of the 
population. As several philosophers and sociologists of medicine and public health scholars 
have highlighted in recent years, this tendency is usually coupled with a more general 
disregard for socio-economic causes of disease in epidemiology and biomedical research 
(Marmot, 2005; Hinchliffe et al., 2018; Clarke et al., 2019). According to Sean Valles (2018; 
2019), this disregard is connected to a methodological and epistemological insistence on 
identifying single, central, and specific causes of disease: in this sense virus infections have 
the causal specificity that social factors such as education lack (Lloyd, 2002). In epidemiology, 
social aspects are admittedly frequently taken into account when investigating the 
determinants of health and disease, especially in social epidemiology (Broadbent, 2013). Yet 
these are still disregarded as proper causal factors – they are often reduced to mere indicators 
or background conditions – and the interactions between social factors, biological processes, 
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and health are (still) largely unclear (Parkinnen et al., 2018; Ghiara & Russo, 2019; Kelly & 
Russo, 2021). As Sheila Jasanoff puts it in a recent interview on the pandemic: 
 
“Attention to physical and material causes is always more highly valued than 
attention to social causes and consequences. Social sciences and social 
problems get lower billing and lesser attention than physical and material causes 
that we think we can control more easily" (Jasanoff, interviewed by Nawal Arjini, 
2020). 
 
This has immediate consequences for factors that are deemed relevant for the representation 
and prediction of pandemics and their public health consequences, and we should thus not 
be surprised that social aspects and social scientific expertise have played a small role 
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. 
  
There are more indirect ramifications of the conceptual dominance of biomedicine for 
evidence-based public health policy. As Bacevic (2020) has pointed out, the types of 
knowledge and expertise that form the evidential basis for policy-making are determined by 
the types of questions policy-makers do and do not ask (also see Bacevic & McGoey 2021). 
On the one hand, this depends on political views and priorities, of course. On the other hand, 
the kinds of questions policy-makers ask also depend on their understanding of the extension 
of ‘public health’ and relevant facets of this concept. If the social dimension of the concept of 
public health is marginalised, we should not expect policy-makers to heavily draw on social 
scientific expertise in dealing with the next pandemic.  
 
Hence, conceptual questions are highly relevant in this context and we should critically 
discuss and possibly conceptually redesign our concept of ‘public health’ (along the lines of 
an ameliorative explication, see Dutilh Novaes, 2020). Philosophers, scientists and policy-
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makers should, in other words, ask again what the extension of this concept should be, how 
it relates to the broader concept of public welfare, and what types of causal factors (biological, 
social, economic etc.) should be considered when policy-makers think about public health 
threats and appropriate mitigation policies. Finding new answers to these and related 
questions would be an important step in our way forward to a more pluralistic approach to 
public health policy.  
 
4.2 Epistemological challenges 
Whenever scientific disciplines come together in a multi-, inter- or transdisciplinary setting, 
the significance of disciplinary boundaries becomes highly visible. There is a large body of 
work investigating social dynamics and “political” issues in those settings, including work on 
different epistemic cultures (especially in life and social sciences), competition between 
epistemic communities, lack of appreciation for other disciplines (and in turn lack of mutual 
engagement, trust and understanding), disciplinary gate keeping etc. (e.g. Brewer, 1999; 
Albert et al. 2009; O’Malley, 2013; Albert et al. 2015). In addition to these issues, there are 
epistemological challenges that affect the integration of the social sciences into public health 
policy. Biomedical and social scientists do not only use different languages, conceptual 
frameworks, and methodologies: the types of knowledge available and aimed for in the 
biomedical and social sciences are extremely different.  
 
First, much of the available knowledge that exists in the social sciences is not as quantified 
and general as biomedical knowledge. Although there is quantitative research in the social 
sciences that aims at generalisability, a substantial part of social scientific knowledge is 
decidedly non-quantitative. This does not only concern sociological and (descriptive) political 
theory, which is often (but not always) expressed qualitatively. In addition, much empirical 
research in the social sciences is qualitative in nature, focusing on a rich description of a 
particular social situation, group or episode. This includes ethnographic studies, narrative 
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interview studies and work based on the interpretation of documents and other human 
artefacts. In all of these cases, evidence is context-specific and data is only occasionally 
quantified (if at all).18 This is clearly in contrast to fields such as epidemiology and virology, 
where knowledge is in most cases presented quantitatively – including numerically expressed 
confidence intervals regarding observational data or model projections – and aims for 
generalisability.  
 
A second epistemological challenge for integrating social science knowledge into public 
health policy points to another basic difference in knowledge. With respect to many issues 
and foundational questions, there exists no stable consensus within the social sciences. This 
does not only hold for theories, methodologies, and empirical claims but runs even deeper: 
 
 “[…] in the social sciences, agreed criteria for evaluating evidential quality are as 
far away as ever. Concepts are contested, and theoretical controversy generally 
welcomed as an indication of intellectual health. The notion of professional 
consensus is foreign to the practice of social science” (Young et al., 2002, p. 223). 
 
The social sciences are, in other words, thoroughly multiparadigmatic disciplines. There is no 
mainstream school or paradigm dominating sociology, political science or cultural 
anthropology. On the contrary, there are deep frictions and long-lasting foundational 
controversies within all of these and neighbouring social sciences (Lohse, 2017; Tang, 2011). 
For instance, in sociology there are rational choice approaches, systems, network and 
practice theories, and many more schools, paradigms and sub-paradigms. Many of these 
have divergent – sometimes even incommensurable – epistemic goals (e.g. prediction vs. 
 
18 The question of the extent to which findings of qualitative studies can – or should – be expressed 
quantitatively is a thorny issue in the (philosophy of the) social sciences. If interpretationists are right in claiming 
that this is in principle not viable, this would point to even bigger epistemological incompatibilities between 
social and biomedical sciences (see also the debate on reasons vs. causes D’Oro & Sandis, 2013). However, in 
this paper we will only make the weaker claim that much social scientific knowledge is indeed qualitative and 
can – for pragmatic reasons – hardly be comprehensively transformed into quantitative knowledge. 
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sense-making), epistemological stances (e.g. interpretationist vs. naturalist), basic ontologies 
(e.g. individualism vs. holism) and methodological preferences (for certain types of qualitative 
or quantitative study designs). This is in contrast with the biomedical sciences, which are not 
as heterogenous and fragmented as the social sciences.19 To be sure, there are many 
empirical controversies in biomedicine (consider different and changing claims on the 
transmissibility of SARS-Cov-2) as well as a fair share of epistemological and ontological 
disputes, for example concerning the structure of predictive models in toxicological research 
and basic properties of genes and viruses (see, e.g., Calabrese & Baldwin, 2003; Stotz et al., 
2004; Dupré & Guttinger, 2016).20 However, biomedicine is not characterised by the same 
multitude of deep-cutting and (frequently paralysing) disputes concerning epistemic aims and 
the legitimacy of different methodological approaches as the social sciences (Kneer & 
Moebius, 2010). Different approaches in biomedicine share a larger set of epistemic 
background commitments than social science paradigms, including an endorsement of 
quantitative and experimental approaches to biomedical problems and phenomena. 
 
These observations are highly relevant for evidence-based policy. Let us assume we want to 
include more social science expertise on societal inequalities in public health policy. Who 
should policy-makers ask? We should expect huge differences regarding the root causes of 
inequality in Europe and ways to address these in a pandemic, depending on who we ask – 
a rational choice theorist or a Neo-Marxist, a qualitative or a quantitative researcher. If we 
want to address this issue, we need to think about ways to incorporate a plurality of social 
science perspectives regarding epistemic claims relevant for public health policy. This may 
be done via pluralistic task forces and by channelling policy-advice through professional 
associations that have an overview of the multiparadigmatic landscape of the social sciences. 
 
19 Note that economics has a dominating (although not completely uncontested) paradigm and is to a much 
higher degree mathematised than the (other) social sciences (Lohse, 2017), which arguably makes it more 
compatible and easier to integrate with biomedical research. 
20 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing us towards these examples and the non-empirical 
nature of many biomedical controversies. 
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This is a complicated task with institutional challenges of its own – but there is more.  We 
would also need to think about ways to integrate qualitative evidence with quantified 
knowledge and models in biomedicine (see El-Sayed & Prainsack, 2021). How can and should 
we weigh and amalgamate these different types of knowledge drawing on different 
epistemological stances in practice? Policy-makers could, of course, take their cue from 
evidence-based medicine and opt for a strict evidence hierarchy that prioritises quantitative 
over qualitative approaches. However, this would structurally disadvantage the social 
sciences and in particular social science paradigms that are more aligned with qualitative 
methodologies than with quantitative study designs. Hence, scientists and policy-makers 
interested in genuine pluralism should explore new ways of translation and evidence 
integration, for example by training scholars that are versed in social and biomedical 
languages and practices and may act as facilitators for interdisciplinary exchange. The 
alternative would mean to favour a certain way of doing science under the banner of 
objectivity (Mercuri, 2020). 
 
4.3 Methodological challenges 
Finally, we want to consider methodological challenges for a tighter integration of the social 
sciences in public health policy. While many of the aforementioned issues at the conceptual 
and epistemological level persist, there is a distinct set of challenges that pertain to the ways 
in which research is actually conducted and applied in the social and biomedical sciences – 
in particular when it comes to data practices. 
 
A first aspect that we want to discuss concerns data selection. As we suggested in the 
previous section, the social sciences can be crucial at pointing data collection in a more 
specific direction, by recommending to test certain social groups, at certain points in time, in 
certain regions, etc. At the same time, however, there are open questions regarding which 
social aspects would need to be measured in the context of a broader public health framing, 
Forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Science 
28 
 
how these should be measured, and whether they can be measured in a valid and reliable 
way. For example, can movements of individuals and interactions within communities be 
tracked in the context of pandemics? Social scientific expertise and evidence on social 
interactions within specific communities could be used to develop policies on this and advice 
on pertinent questions, including whether this is something that should be done and on which 
characteristics of a community an answer to this question might depend. In this sense, the 
COVID-19 pandemic has already posed significant questions and exacerbated discussions 
on data at the intersection of issues of surveillance, policing, and monitoring (Kitchin, 2020). 
With the increasing importance of trends such as personalised medicine and the ‘datification’ 
of individual practices, the integration of social scientific evidence and considerations are 
important to provide grounding and trustworthiness to data selection. For instance, more 
personal and invasive technologies such as wearable devices have been used to track and 
collect data that can be used to analyse and (possibly) predict COVID-19 infections before 
symptoms occur (Mishra et al., 2020). This type of data could be used as evidence for policy 
interventions, such as the early isolation of (possibly) infected individuals, but these 
considerations would benefit from coordination with social scientific (and ethical) expertise 
on the sensitivity of these data, their quality and reliability, and suitability for interventions at 
the social level.21 Yet, so far the use of these data has mostly been discussed in the biomedical 
and technology sector, with little interactions with the social sciences and consideration of 
the contextual and qualitative knowledge that would improve data assessment, integration, 
and use in coordination with existing evidence and policy (Vayena, 2021; El-Sayed & 
Prainsack, 2021). 
 
An additional cluster of challenges that we want to highlight concerns practices of data 
collection and data infrastructure. Evidential standards can differ even on what counts as data 
 
21 Sabina Leonelli (2021b) makes a compelling case for including community representatives alongside social 
scientists in decisions on these issues to enhance normative awareness and increase benefits for both 
researchers and the public. 
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– and in particular high-quality data – between the biomedical and social sciences. 
Epidemiologists often prefer to use data about biological processes in populations and 
environments as proxies for social processes, over the use of data collected in the social 
sciences (see e.g. Canali, 2020). The ways in which health and disease are measured and 
studied in epidemiology are based on individuals as the main units of analysis (which are then 
aggregated in populations), and this is in clear opposition to data collection practices in 
several areas of the social sciences (Kelly & Russo, 2021). In addition, the types of data 
collected in the biomedical sciences often require extensive work before they can be used as 
biomedical evidence, which makes data practices – including curation, preparation, clustering 
and ordering – crucial epistemic passages (Leonelli, 2019a). In contrast, in the social sciences, 
where a similar amount of work is required to make data traceable and usable as evidence in 
more than one context, curation practices are not as advanced and archival work is mostly 
not considered as important. While contextual information, metadata, and the initial raw 
materials play a crucial role in various areas of biology and medicine, they are not seen as 
equally important in the social sciences (Boumans & Leonelli, 2020) (although there are signs 
of change in this regard, see, e.g., plans for a centralised multidisciplinary data infrastructure 
in Germany22). This is also reflected in differences between databases and archives in the 
biomedical and social sciences: they are much more abundant and central in biomedicine, 
where they serve as epistemic and institutional grounding for several research communities 
(Ankeny & Leonelli, 2016).  
 
Thus, for a tighter integration of the social sciences into public health policy, we would need 
to address issues on the level of data policies, practices, and infrastructure.  A long-term goal 
could be to combine social scientific and biomedical evidence in integrated assessment 
models for pandemics. Integrated assessment models attempt to combine aggregated 
evidence from different academic fields, in particular economics and life/earth sciences, to 
 
22 See https://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/nfdi/index.html (accessed July 2021).  
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project possible developments (or ‘scenarios’) depending on different policy options and 
feedback effects. These models have been predominantly used to inform decision-makers in 
the context of climate policy, but there have also been first steps towards using these in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Raboisson & Lhermie, 2020 and the model by Dorn 
et al., 2020, integrating economic and biomedical assumptions and data). However, exploring 
integrated assessment modelling to inform public health policy in times of crisis would mean 
that we need to address additional methodological problems. Which aspects of biomedical 
and societal reality do we want to map (this question also has a conceptual dimension, see 
above)? In which ways can we aggregate and balance different forms of data and 
uncertainties? How should we deal with social feedback effects and modelling trade-offs 
(such as between precision and generality)? These and similar issues touch on 
methodological issues in model building and their value-ladeness and are well-known in 
discussions on climate modelling and policy-making (Beck & Krueger, 2016). They would also 
need to be addressed in the context of evidence-based public health policy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: Normative implications and ways forward 
In this paper, we have used the case of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe to address the 
question of what kind of knowledge we should incorporate into public health policy. We have 
shown that policy-making in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic has been biomedicine-
centric in that its evidential basis marginalised input from non-biomedical disciplines. We have 
then argued that in particular the social sciences could contribute essential expertise and 
evidence to public health policy in times of biomedical emergencies and that we should thus 
strive for a tighter integration of the social sciences in future evidence-based policy-making. 
This demand faces a number of challenges on different levels, which we have identified and 
discussed as potential inhibitors for a more pluralistic evidential basis. Several challenges at 
conceptual, epistemological and methodological levels need to be addressed by scientists, 
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policy-makers and philosophers of science, among other interest parties, if we want to 
improve future public health policy, in particular in times of crisis.  
 
As we have seen, epistemic challenges for a tighter integration of the social sciences in public 
health policy are manifold and do not give hope for easy solutions. They need to be addressed 
on different levels and often negotiated between different stakeholder groups. Conceptual 
decisions about which social aspects should be considered as relevant for a re-engineered 
concept of public health must be made at the interface of science and policy. Epistemological 
and methodological discussions regarding data integration and the weighting of evidence will 
need to involve biomedical and social scientists and possibly also experts on science-based 
policy. In the course of these discussions, there will emerge organisational questions to be 
addresses as well. For instance, we would need to think not only about what needs to be 
measured and how, but about who should be responsible for collecting and storing data on 
potentially public health-relevant social aspects. Research policy could fund comprehensive 
programmes to incentivise appropriate social research projects, or the disciplinary horizon of 
public health agencies could be broadened to include more social scientists and increase the 
collection of relevant social data. It is likely that approaches will vary across Europe which 
makes it vital to also think about scientific institutions and data infrastructure in this context. 
We would need to discuss how we can develop better organised data repositories for the 
social sciences, to what extent these can be open access (in view of highly sensitive data 
sets), and, finally, who should be responsible for creating and curating these. Philosophers of 
science and STS scholars working on big data, data infrastructure, and open science can 
contribute to these discussions (e.g. Holmberget al., 2013; Leonelli, 2019b; Vayena, 2021). 
 
As a last step, we want to turn a spotlight on the ethical dimension of our epistemic analysis 
and touch on related points. We first want to stress that thinking about ways to improve future 
public health policies is not only laudable but also ethically required, considering that the 
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likelihood of new pandemics is higher than ever. Despite the temptation to think that the 
COVID-19 pandemic was a once-in-a-lifetime event, the emergence of (more) zoonotic 
diseases and pandemics is unfortunately on the horizon due to the ongoing transformation of 
ecosystems into agricultural systems and mass animal farming, among other things (Birch, 
2021; Gibb et al., 2020). In other words, we might live in a new age of pandemics. As a 
consequence, we should, of course, strive to limit or discontinue practices that are major 
anthropogenic drivers for the emergence of new zoonotic diseases, in particular wildlife 
consumption and animal farming (Wiebers & Feigin, 2020). However, we should also prepare 
for a future where our efforts in this direction may be of limited success – which seems to be 
prudent given the lack of appropriate action taken to avoid global warming in the last decades. 
Preparing for such a future implies thinking critically about ways to improve our public health 
response to future pandemics and to include essential types of evidence and expertise that 
the sciences – including the social sciences – can provide. 
 
To be clear, the social sciences are important beyond their contribution to policy in terms of 
evidence and expertise. The critical and reflexive potential of the social sciences exceeds 
their possible role within evidence-based policy. For example, social scientific work that has 
highlighted the neglect of local expertise and insufficient attention to social issues has been 
crucial in identifying blind spots of policy. On a more general level, critical social sciences will 
be important to understand, evaluate and debunk claims of scientific objectivity and 
evidence-based public health policy-making – including its use of scientific language to 
conceal political value judgements and its overreliance on the (questionable) objectivity of 
numbers in justifying policy decisions (see Bogner & Menz, 2021 for an interesting discussion 
on expertise during the COVID-19 pandemic). 23 As we have mentioned at the beginning of 
 
23  At the same time, we think that the interdisciplinary and pluralistic direction we suggest in the article can avoid 
the risk of sometimes oversimplifying "anti-science critiques" that have been advanced. Discussions that include 
both biomedical scientists and social scientists can help to provide more complex answers to difficult public health 
questions – rather than merely highlighting the limitations of one side of the discussion. 
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our analysis, several governments have framed their policy as a way of “following the science” 
and doing what scientists and evidence told them to do. The social science can provide 
crucial tools to scrutinise these and similar statements and bring to light the values that 
actually guide policy-making and its use of scientific evidence. It goes without saying that the 
humanities, in particular history and philosophy, should be considered important allies in this 
task. 
 
But even as active contributors to evidence-based policy, the social sciences are much more 
than providers of evidence. They can add an independent perspective and open up additional 
dimensions in our understanding of pandemics. This is an essential aspect of our demand to 
improve interdisciplinary knowledge integration in public health policy. Without a more 
pluralistic body of evidence, certain issues will be addressed disproportionately in policy-
making and in particular social aspects will be underrepresented, eventually leading to myopic 
goal-setting and imbalanced decision-making in public health policy (which has been a major 
point of public critique in many European countries). Our point here is not that we would 
necessarily have had less restrictive COVID-19 policies if we had properly considered “the 
social side” of the situation in public health policy. Rather, we want to argue that a tighter 
integration of the social sciences in public health policy would have allowed for better 
informed and targeted policy measures during the COVID-19 pandemic and will allow for 
better policy in future public health crises. In particular, it will enable policy-makers to evaluate 
different policy options on the basis of truly pluralistic evidence that allows for a more 
adequate discussion of ethical key questions for public health programmes: How effective 
will this policy measure be in achieving its goals? What are its known burdens to different 
communities and how can these be minimised or balanced? Are there alternative options that 
could be implemented?24  
 
24 See the ethical framework for public health programmes developed by Kass (2001) for a detailed discussion of 
these and related questions.  




Addressing these critical questions by including social scientific perspectives can allow for 
more fine-grained harm-benefit-analyses, and it can help to develop policy options that would 
be based not only on biomedical data, epidemiological projections and the occasional “expert 
statement” by social scientists, but also on actual evidence on social issues. Moreover, 
policies informed by pluralistic and interdisciplinary evidence can, with good reason, be 
considered to be more objective. There have been several calls for objective evidence and 
policy in the COVID-19 context, and yet these considerations tend to be restricted to 
procedural notions of objectivity that consider the use of evidence as a neutral activity and 
only specific types of data as evidence (Jukola & Canali, 2021). In contrast to these views, 
incorporating interdisciplinary knowledge can strengthen objectivity by bringing a diversity of 
approaches and perspectives into contact, thereby avoiding one-sided and potentially biased 
views of reality (Longino, 1990; see also Mill, 2015[1859], chap. II). Hence, pluralism and 
interdisciplinary knowledge integration in evidence-based public health policy is justified on 
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